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ABSTRACT
The question of how to contend with terrorism in keeping with our pre-
existing moral and legal commitments now challenges Europe as well as 
Israel and the United States: how do we apply Just War Theory and 
International Law to asymmetrical warfare, specifically to our counter 
terrorism measures? What can the classic moral argument in Just and 
Unjust Wars teach us about contemporary targeted killings with drones? 
I begin with a defense of targeted killing, arguing for the advantages of 
pin pointed attacks over any alternative measure available for combatting 
terrorism. Assuming the legitimacy of killing combatants in wartime, I 
argue, there is nothing wrong, and in fact much that is right, with targeting 
particular terrorists selected by name, as long as their assassinations can 
be reasonably expected to reduce terrorist hostilities rather than increase 
it. Subsequently, I offer some further thoughts and comments on the 
use of remotely piloted aircrafts to carry out targeted killings, and address 
the various sources for discomfort with this practice identified by Michael 
Walzer and others.
It is always a hard question whether new technologies require the 
revision of old arguments. Targeted killing isn’t new, and I am go-
ing to repeat an old argument about it. But targeted killing with 
drones? Here the old argument, though it still makes sense, leaves 
me uneasy.1 
Michael Walzer
As the US and Israel continuously wage war on terror, they increasingly find them-
selves under attack for their policy of assassinating terrorist leaders. It has been 
argued that targeted killing violates international standards of legitimate warfare 
and that it is on a par with political assassination, or extra-judicial execution, and 
as such unequivocally banned by international law. In the extreme, it has been 
compared with the terrorist activity it purports to combat. Nevertheless, Former 
US President Obama repeatedly stated and demonstrated that targeted killing is 
his favored counter-terrorism measure. Israel, which has long resorted to this tac-
tic, escalated its use after the outbreak of the second Intifada. 
1 Walzer 2016: 12. 
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Targeted killing can be carried out by ground forces or by conventional  airplanes, 
and it may involve the use of bullets, bombs or poison.2 Mostly though, at least in 
the American case, targeted killings are performed by “drones”, operated at a dis-
tance. These are also the well-publicized cases of targeted killing, attracting the 
greatest public attention, not least because of the collateral damage they are re-
ported to incur, and possibly due to the science fiction type images they invoke in 
popular imagination. 
The question of how to contend with terrorism in keeping with our pre-exist-
ing moral and legal commitments now challenges Europe as well as Israel and the 
United States: how do we apply Just War Theory and International Law to asym-
metrical warfare, specifically to our counter terrorism measures? What can the 
classic moral argument in Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer 1977) teach us about con-
temporary targeted killings with drones? 
In a series of recent article and interviews, Michael Walzer takes up this new 
challenge, accepting some old arguments about targeted killing, while expressing 
reservations over the increased, and largely unsupervised use (overuse or misuse) 
of drones to perform this task at a distance, as well as unease over some choices 
of target (Walzer 2013; 2016).3 
The following section briefly restates my own old argument for targeted killing, 
much of which is based on what I learned from Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. As 
is immediately apparent, I diverge slightly from Walzer in unequivocally adopting 
the ‘armed-conflict’ model as the only relevant framework for assessing our gov-
ernments’ anti-terrorism strategies, rather than considering any law enforcement 
procedures, or any mixture of the two regimes.4 The subsequent section offers some 
further thoughts and comments regarding the specific use of remotely piloted air-
crafts to carry out targeted killings, and addresses the various sources for discom-
fort with this practice identified by Walzer and others. 
Targeted Killing 
The key to the argument that targeted killing is legitimate under international 
law is the contentious proposition that a state of war, or armed conflict, exists be-
tween states and terrorist organizations. In the forthcoming arguments, I follow 
the American and Israeli Supreme Courts in maintaining that the relevant norma-
tive framework for considering counter-terrorism measures is that of an (interna-
tional/non international) armed conflict, bringing the full privileges of belligeren-
cy into play.5 More generally, I suggest that where international law is unclear and 
2 As in Israel’s failed targeting of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Jordan in 1997, when 
Mossad agents administered poison into Mashal’s left ear. Israel was subsequently com-
pelled to hand over the antidote. 
3 Michael Walzer, on Whether Drones Should Be Banned, Berkley Center, March 13th, 
2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ky5iYOKORBA.
4 Cf. Walzer, Walzer 2016: 13–14. See also the discussion of “jus ad vim” in Walzer 2006: 
xv–xvi. 
5 For Israel, see: HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government 
of Israel (Targeted Killings Case) [2005] and HCJ 7015/02. For the US, see: E.g. Maxwell 
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indeterminate – that is, where alternative interpretations are possible – we ought 
to adopt an understanding of ‘armed conflict’ that does not exclude the new wars 
we are actually fighting. 
Once at war, or engaged in armed conflict, any combatant may be killed under 
circumstances that far outstrip those that constrain ordinary self-defense (Gross 
2004: 104). Terrorists are unquestionably combatants, albeit irregular combatants: 
they are the instigators, organizers, recruiters, commanders and operatives of an 
armed struggle. At the very least, terrorists belong to a type of unprotected civil-
ians who are not unengaged in hostilities.6 
Like political assassination, targeted killing aims at its victims narrowly and 
attempts to avoid collateral deaths. Ordinary citizens remain, so far as possible, 
immune from attack. While targeted killing shares this morally favorable aspect 
of political assassination, it avoids the normative shortcomings of assassination. 
First, targeted killing does not take aim at protected civilians who are unengaged 
in military activity. Second, unlike political assassination, targeting terrorists does 
not require a complex political evaluation of the victims cause, determining who 
is and who is not a political enemy; at most it requires a moral stand against ter-
rorism. Terrorists are targeted for what they do – not for the causes they serve. 
Targeted killing shares the moral advantages of political assassination – the line it 
draws between liable targets and ordinary civilians – without retaining its prob-
lematic aspects. The terrorists’ paramilitary status serves to distinguish targeted 
killing from political assassination, which targets civilian officials. Military objec-
tive – preventing and combatting terrorism rather than punishment – serves to 
distinguish targeted killing from “extra-judicial execution”. 
In the context of war, it is somewhat puzzling even to consider a judicial option 
– capture and trial of terrorists – as a first and preferable (albeit often impractical) 
option.7 Exhausting the difficult and costly option of arrests is not legally required.8 
In war, the law authorizes the use of lethal force as first resort against enemy per-
sons and objects within the parameters of the armed conflict (Corn 2009: 1347–
1348). There is no wartime requirement to attempt capture and trial of combatants 
in war, rather than killing them as a first resort. Arguably, “unlawful combatants”, 
as opposed to soldiers, may also be targeted in unconventional settings, including 
civilian surroundings such as their homes and in their beds, because there is no 
other realistic way of combatting them, no front line to be considered. Terrorists 
defy all conventional rules that confine combat to the battlefield, and are therefore 
unentitled to their reciprocal protections (Statman 2003a: 196). They force armies 
to combat them in the midst of civilians, or else relinquish the fight altogether. 
2012: 49, Blum and Heymann 2010: 157. Former President Barack Obama, Speech at the 
National Defense University. 
6 This was the terminology adopted by former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon 
Barak in HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 
(Targeted Killings Case) [2005], esp. paragraph 31. 
7 Cf. Walzer 2016: 13, who does not accept the war model in all cases, and argues that it 
would be better to bring terrorists to trial, though this is not always a reasonable option. 
8 HCJ 769/02 [Dec. 11 2005]. Para. 40. 
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In the United States, the debate over targeting terrorists concerns two distinct 
types of military strategy, often carried out by drones: “personality strikes” and 
“signature strikes” (Heller 2013: 90). Strictly speaking, only personality strikes are 
targeted killings. They involve the listing and subsequent assassination of previous-
ly identified named individuals (Waldron 2015: 2). Israel, as well as the US, openly 
engages in personality strikes when it targets leading figures in Hamas. Signature 
strikes, by contrast, are mostly US drone attacks that target groups of men who 
have certain behavioral characteristics associated with terrorist activities or mem-
bership in Al Qaeda or its affiliates, but whose identities are unknown. As Andrew 
Altman explains, “Their ‘signature’ behavior functions as if it were the uniform of 
an enemy force, opening them to lethal attack, in the eyes of the U.S. government”. 
(Altman 2014: 3–4) 
The majority of strikes launched by the US appear to have been signature strikes, 
and most of the CIA strikes apparently fall into this category (Altman 2014: 3–4), 
(though it may be the case that signature attacks were cut back towards the end of 
the Obama administration) (Walzer 2016: 17). Whether or not signature strikes (par-
ticularly as carried out by the US) are justifiable in the course of combating terror, 
they are much more like “untargeted killing”, as most wartime killings are. Jeremy 
Waldron points out that in some cases, “drones pass over areas like insurgent or 
terrorist training camps where, it is presumed, any young man present especially 
if he is armed is deemed a legitimate target whether he has been specifically iden-
tified or not.” (Waldron 2015: 2) These are not individualized killings, and actually 
appear quite similar to conventional wartime targets. In other contexts, where tar-
gets are not clearly paramilitary, or analogous to a military base or camp, it cannot 
be legitimate to automatically count all males of military age as liable combatants.9 
In such cases, individualization of the target may actually be required, determining 
liable targets for “personality strikes”.
Judged under a wartime regime, there is nothing wrong, and in fact much that 
is right, about targeting individual terrorists – whether by name, or simply because 
of their part in hostilities. Killing terrorists is a legitimate and desirable military 
objective. In terms of proportionality, it is a good to be weighed against any re-
grettable harm to civilians. 
Regarding civilians and their surroundings, much critical attention has been 
focused on the collateral damage incurred in the course of targeting operations, as 
well as on the specifically American use of drones and their effect on the surround-
ing population. In war, however, armies are authorized to attack and kill enemy 
combatants in ways that foreseeably cause death and injury to civilians, as long as 
the anticipated harm to civilians is not disproportionate “in relation to the direct 
and concrete military advantage anticipated” (Altman 2014: 19). In fact, when tar-
geted killings are carried out with due care, they actually cause far less collateral 
damage than many conventional wartime tactics. This is the very essence of the 
case for pinpointed attacks. 
In principle then, targeting terrorists in the course of an armed conflict as a 
preventive, rather than a punitive, measure is a legitimate defensive act, subject to 
9 Cf. Walzer 2013. For the Israeli Court discussion of “direct part in hostilities” see HCJ 
769/02 Para 33–40.
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the usual necessity, proportionality and reasonable chance of success conditions. 
Moreover, judged as a wartime tactic, targeted killing is a particularly limited and 
fastidious form of combat and is therefore often morally preferable to alternative 
modes of belligerency commonly employed in war. 
In practice, care and caution regarding choice of target and enemy civilians are 
crucial to the justification of targeted killing (Walzer 2016: 14). Both the Israeli Su-
preme Court and the Obama administration publicly affirmed various conditions. 
Whether high standards are actually met in practice is a further issue of conten-
tion (Walzer 2016: 15–18). Opposition to targeted killing often points to the lack 
of clarity surrounding the decision-making procedure and to the manner in which 
attacks are carried out. Such worries include suspicion of government power, fear 
of its abuse, lack of transparency, mistakes, misjudgments, use of unmanned air-
craft, killing by “remote control” (Walzer 2016: 15–18). All these are secondary ar-
guments against targeted killing (which does not make them any weaker). They do 
not principally oppose the killings themselves but rather express concern about 
their execution in practice, as well as about the feasibility of carrying out such op-
erations legitimately. At the very least, they call for institutional guarantees against 
abuse of government power and related dangers.
None of these objections present conclusive arguments against the permissibil-
ity of targeting terrorists. Such concerns can, and should, be resolved in keeping 
with the general wartime framework in which these attacks are carried out. That 
is, we should require the standards of care and caution for enemy combatants and 
civilians, as well as the extent of oversight of administrative power, that we would 
normally require during wartime (e.g. review by a legal advisors) and in accordance 
with the standards applied to any other act of war. 
One such requirement is reasonable chance of success. What is the point of tar-
geted killing? “These Killings are part of a strategy of disruption and decapitation 
directed against terrorist organizations.” (Waldron 2011). Does this work? Oppo-
nents suggest, that such killings actually solicit acts of retaliation, deepen hostility 
and mistrust by antagonizing surrounding populations, encourage radicalization 
and jeopardize the chance of peace, escalating, enhancing and prolonging conflicts, 
rather than reducing terrorism (Gross 2003: 352, 356–358; Gross 2004: 100–103, 
113; Gross 2010: 111). 
Judging the expediency of targeted killing is admittedly fraught with difficulties. 
“Thwarted attacks remain unobserved, and counterfactuals – attacks that would 
have been launched had there never been a firm assassination policy – are diffi-
cult to gauge.” (Gross 2003: 357; Gross 2004: 101; Gross 2010: 114-117). As Daniel 
Statman points out, however, “Morally speaking, wars are a risky business. Still, 
according to just war theory, one is allowed to use lethal measures if there are good 
reasons to believe they will be efficient in self-defense.” (Statman 2003b: 778). In 
keeping with just war theory, we need not be absolutely sure that the strategy we 
employ is conducive to our defense; we need only employ it in good faith on the 
general assumption that it has a reasonable hope of success, and show good cause 
for this belief (Statman 2003a: 193; 2015: 9). 
What causes might we have for this belief? Proponents of targeted killing read-
ily admit that assassinations do not annihilate terrorism in one fell swoop. No one 
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argues that it presents an overall solution to terrorism. Those of us who support it 
believe that assassinating terrorists is a successful means of reducing terrorist hos-
tility, at least in the long run, as it acts both as a deterrent (rather than punishment) 
and as an impediment in the face of terrorist organizations and their leaders. Such 
killings weaken terrorist groups, cause demoralization among their members, force 
them into hiding, and restrict their movements and activity. Underground terror-
ist movements with little internal structure often rely on the personal charisma or 
professional skills of the leaders and key figures of certain organizations. It is rea-
sonable to believe that killing such individuals will gradually make it harder for the 
terror machinery to function (Statman 2003a: 192; 2003b: 778). 
Moreover, assessing the efficacy of assassination policies involves evaluating not 
only their long-term (rather than merely immediate) effects but also their psycho-
logical impact. Terrorist leaders faced with personal danger often conceal them-
selves in the midst of civilian populations and reposition themselves constantly. 
The consistent and vivid threat posed by the “long arm” of their enemy, which is 
out there waiting to pluck them out of any place perhaps when they least expect 
it, presents a considerable emotional and practical obstacle. Wanted arch-terror-
ists do not go about their business as usual. Instead, they move around incessantly 
hoping to confound their enemy, presumably at considerable cost to their missions 
and public image. Left to their own devices there is every probability that terrorists 
will resume their activities. Finally, targeted killing has at least one definite con-
sequentialist benefit; namely, it carries with it a far lower risk of bad moral results 
than any other available military strategy. Targeted killing is our best shot at com-
bating terrorism at the lowest cost to human life (Statman 2003b: 778; 2003a: 193; 
Gross 2004: 99, 113; Gross 2010: 101). 
Drones
What about collateral harm and resentment caused by drone warfare, as well as fur-
ther objections directed at the use of unmanned aerial vehicles “killing by remote 
control” (Strawser 2013)? Although there is no essential connection between the 
use of drones and the principled argument over targeted killing, the two issues are 
at least contingently connected and the moral debate about drones is very much 
entangled with the debate about the morality and the legality of targeted killing 
(Statman 2015: 8). Some disentangling is in order. 
First and most obviously: regardless of academic debate, drones are here to stay. 
To quote the recent American film Good Kill: “Drones aren’t going anywhere. In 
fact they’re going everywhere”.10 Perhaps quite soon everyone will have them (Wal-
zer 2013, 2016: 18), though the feasibility of non-state actors successfully operating 
drone programs in American or Israeli skies appears most unlikely.11 
10 Good Kill (2014), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3297330/.
11 The popular notion that anyone can buy a drone is comically reflected in the BBC series 
Episodes, where Matt Leblanc tells Sean he’s thinking of buying a drone, to do drone stuff. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VT3wRBueTJY (Episodes, Season 4, episode 7). I doubt 
this potential is a source for concern. It seems a far cry from watching the tops of birds to 
launching successful drone warfare against mighty nations like Israel and the  United States. 
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And this is the second point about drones – they are inherently a-symmetrical 
weapons favoring states, both morally and strategically. Arguably, this is actually 
one of their advantages. Running an effective drone program requires sophisticat-
ed satellite systems, large infrastructure and trained manpower, where state-level 
air superiority is already established and working in cooperation with the drone 
operations. Despite the remote-control imagery, Walzer explains, “drones are ac-
tually flown from bases fairly near their targets and it requires some 170 people 
to maintain the drones and get them into the air.” (Walzer 2016: 15) Given the ex-
pense and complexity of running an effectively lethal drone-system, as well as the 
anti-aircraft defenses operated in Israel and the U.S, drones would be entirely in-
effective, not even particularly desirable, in the hands of non-state actors or their 
patrons aiming to kill civilians.12 
Drones are not suitable weapons for individuals or terrorist organizations fly-
ing over countries with anti-aircraft capability. They are a weapon of states, par-
ticularly good states aspiring to distinguish combatants from civilians, though we 
know that good states will not always act well. Such asymmetry may seem unfair, 
but it is actually a moral point in favor of drones. In terms of upholding traditional 
jus in bello, drones are useful to the “good guys”. They are precision weapons, of-
fering the possibility of careful compliance with the laws of war, to those who wish 
to comply. They are not particularly advantageous for engaging in wholesale kill-
ing or terrorism; less sophisticated low-tech weapons will suffice to do that trick. 
Strategically, western style liberal democracies and their leaders are vulnerable 
to the threat of terrorism against civilians, as well as to terroristic abuse of the laws 
of war that occurs when terrorists use their own civilian as human shields in order 
to deter attacks by nations committed to the principle of distinction. Anti-aircraft 
warfare, on the other hand, is not one of our weaknesses (if they get drones, we’ll 
shoot them down). Without complete state-level air superiority, drones are in-
credibly ineffective. They are slow, and can easily be shot down by even the most 
basic anti-aircraft defenses. Drones offer a built-in advantage to states that try to 
 distinguishing between combatants and civilians over murderous terrorist organi-
zations that kill indiscriminately. 
12 B. J. Strawser explains: Many speak of drones not as individual weapons, but more as 
“drone systems.” Each drone flight involves the drone itself (or drones, usually many drones 
working in tandem), but also involves the integrated satellite systems that navigate them 
and communicate with them anywhere on the planet, the ground uplink stations them-
selves that send and receive this communication, as well as sophisticated secondary satel-
lite systems the piloting teams draw upon for navigation. It is this – the large infrastructure 
that is required for even minimally successful drone operations – that is only plausible for 
states to possess; and far out of the reach of even the most well-funded non-state actor 
groups. Additionally, without state-level air superiority, drones are incredibly ineffective. 
They are slow, lumbering planes that can easily be shot down by even the most basic an-
ti-aircraft defenses. They would be like shooting down a slow moving, low flying Cessna, 
or even easier. The only reason they are effective where we use them is because we use 
them in places where complete air superiority is already established and working in coop-
eration with the drone operations. Non-state actors almost never have this. As such, even 
if they somehow COULD co-opt the massive infrastructure needed for an effective drone 
program (which I don't think they could), their drones would be pathetically and easily shot 
down out of the sky almost instantly.
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Third, given the previous points (drones are not going away, and they are essen-
tially a weapon for (relatively) good states) the relevant question is how – not if – to 
use them. The laws and customs of war supply the answer: aim narrowly at identi-
fied combatants, sparing civilians whenever possible. Drones have this capacity to 
refine, rather than dull our moral sensibilities, and enhance compliance with the 
laws about distinction and proportionality, minimizing collateral damage. If they 
are not used to this end, then human are at fault, not the machines they employ. 
Many of the earlier arguments about targeted killing pertain to the use of drones 
as well. Assuming the war model and last resort, Statman poses and answers the 
appropriate question: “Are civilians put at higher risk of harm by the use of drones 
than by the use of alternative measures?” (Statman 2015: 2; 2014: 41) Here again: 
The crucial point to remember here is that the alternative to the use of drones is not 
the avoidance of violence altogether, which would entail zero-risk to civilians but 
the use of other, more conventional, lower-tech measures, such as tanks, helicop-
ters, and so on. (Of course, if the use of force were not necessary, there would be 
no justification for using force even when no harm to civilians was to be expected). 
But such imprecise measures would almost certainly lead to more civilian casual-
ties rather than to fewer.13 
More critical of drone warfare generally, Jeff McMahan nonetheless concedes 
that the advantage of remotely controlled weapons is their ability to be highly dis-
criminating in the targets they destroy:
What differentiates the newer models of remotely controlled weapons from tra-
ditional long-range precision-guided munitions is that they allow their operators 
to monitor the target area for lengthy periods before deciding whether, when, and 
where to strike. These are capacities that better enable the weapons operators to 
make morally informed decisions about the use of their weapons. (Statman 2015: 42) 
Similarly, Walzer notes, drones “combine the capacity for surveillance with the 
capacity for precise attack” (Walzer 2013).
Solving one moral problem, however, may in this case entail another. Drones 
that hover above for lengthy periods of time enable better informed moral deci-
sions but what about the psychological collateral harms they inflict, as the costs of 
increased precision is offloaded onto surrounding civilians “Living under Drones”.14 
The undoubtedly terrifying experience of daily life under the continuous buzz-
ing of circling predator drones overhead, monitoring their target area for lengthy 
periods of time, is by now well documented, as well as quite easily imaginable.15 Is-
raelis, in particular, cannot be impervious to this argument that counts psycholog-
ical harm to civilians in wartime proportionality calculations. This type of damage 
13 Statman 2014: 42.; Statman 2015: 2., 41-45, 42.
14 Living under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices 
in Pakistan, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law 
School; Global Justice Clinic, NYU School of Law (September, 2012). 
http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf 
15 Ibid. See esp. Chapter 3, 59–101. This is the core section of the report, including first 
hand accounts describing the emotional trauma, as well as the total disruption of every as-
pect of private and social life, caused by drone attacks in Pakistan. See also the testimony 
in Appendix A. 
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to civilians has been repeatedly appealed to by Israel in justifying massive military 
incursions into the Gaza strip, in response to relatively few casualties on the Israeli 
side. Both in 2008-9 and more recently, Israel has effectively suggested that its pro-
portionality calculus accounts not only for the physical costs inflicted by Hamas, 
but also the psychological implications to its southern population living under the 
continuous threat of Hamas rocket attacks. Advocating for Israel in these matters 
commonly involves reference to the devastating, life-disrupting, emotionally trau-
matic and economic costs to terrorized civilians, rather than merely to the number 
of actual fatalities on the ground (Dershowitz 2009). And what is true when mak-
ing ‘the case for Israel’, must apply with even greater force in the case of civilians 
under drones in Pakistan and elsewhere. 
I have no experience of living under drones, and only short-term experience of 
living under ineffective Hamas rocket attacks (as well as Scud missiles from Sadam 
Hussein’s Iraq in 1991). Despite the statistically low risk, shrieking rockets (not to 
mention buzzing drones) imminently threatening sudden death or injury from the 
skies, is admittedly quite an unsettling and unnerving experience, most notably for 
children. All the more so, I can only imagine, in the case of effective lethal aerial 
vehicles circling in the sky for extended stretches of time, threatening to strike at 
any moment.16 Waldron is quite right to point out that the relevant perspective for 
assessing the terrorizing effects of drones is that of the people who actually endure 
them, rather than professional risk assessments (Waldron 2015: 14). 
Terror on the ground (far more so in Pakistan than in Tel Aviv) must be account-
ed for in any proportionality calculation, whether ad bellum (as in the Israeli case) 
or in bello, when the US chooses its weapons for combating terror. Nevertheless, 
psychological harm to civilians, just like any other collateral damage in war, has to 
be balanced alongside, and as against, other considerations such as military objec-
tives and the costs of alternative weapons. 
One significant factor in comparing terrorized populations with the terrifying 
effects of drones is the question of intent. Is the harm to civilians intentional, or 
is it a side effect of a legitimate objective? In the case of terror bombings, civilian 
casualties are intended directly, providing a just cause for war, as are the addition-
ally terrorizing effects of these murderous attacks. Similarly (though not entirely 
equivalently), drones ought not to be deployed deliberately to “hover visibly and 
audibly precisely in order to terrify the villagers, so that they expel Taliban militants 
hiding among them” (Walzer 2016: 16). In the case of drones, psychological harm 
is justifiable to the extent that it is incurred sincerely as an undesirable side-effect 
of the war on terror. Moreover, unlike physical collateral damage, justifiable solely 
with reference to military objective, the frightening effects of drones are primarily 
the by-product of their surveillance capacity, focusing their aim and minimizing 
concrete harm to civilians. 
Consider the following important point by Walzer in response to Stanford/NYU 
Clinics’ reports. Notwithstanding clear evidence of constant fear and buzzing drones, 
Walzer notes that… the very effectiveness of drone attacks raises questions about these 
16 See Living under Drones, p. 81, where one man describes this harrowing experience, de-
scribing the reaction to the sound of the drones as “a wave of terror” coming over the com-
munity: “Children, grown-up people, women, they are terrified… They scream in terror.”
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accounts of the fear they provoke. Attacking drones must hover at such high altitudes 
that they can’t be seen or heard. If they didn’t do that, the intended targets, who pre-
sumably know they are targets, would simply stay out of sight” (Walzer 2016: 16).
Walzer adds: 
Even the most nuanced accounts are contradictory: Gusterson quotes reporters who 
liken the sound of drones to “lawnmowers in the sky,” but then describes a success-
ful killing that happened “without warning”.17 
Undeniably, reconnaissance drones hover (and hum) at lower (visible and  audible) 
altitudes. But they do so precisely in order to allow for accurate targeting of a partic-
ular individual. So while, “The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder of 
immanent death”,18 it should also serve as a reminder of our attempt to spare civilians. 
Is there nonetheless something about killing at a distance that makes drones 
particularly objectionable or prone to misuse? Historically, hurling flying cannon 
balls, tearing people apart across the battlefield, must also have seemed like terri-
fying remotely controlled weapons in their time. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, how-
ever, are entirely distanced from the battlefield and offer their operators (though 
not necessarily everyone involved in maintaining the drones and getting them air-
borne) (Walzer 2016: 15) the advantage of risk-free combat. Various writers have 
suggested that riskless warfare is a bad in itself, either because it renders one’s op-
ponent non-threatening and therefore non-liable to attack in self-defense (Kahn 
2002: 3),19 or else because it is dishonorable, unfair, and lacking in military valor.20 
Some objections to drone strikes – those concerning asymmetrical warfare, distant 
engagement, the loss of old fashioned military virtues and defenseless targets fac-
ing a faceless death – apply equally to long range missiles21 and, though perhaps to 
some lesser degree, also to aerial bombardment by manned aircrafts. 
A number of answers have been put forth to these objections, most notably by 
B.J Strawser and Danny Statman. Drones are economical: morally, they have the 
capacity to minimize casualties among civilians and combatants; financially, they 
are relatively cost-effective for states to produce and deploy in relation to inhab-
ited planes carrying out similar missions, freeing shared resources for welfare ex-
penditure (Strawser 2010: 344). Consequently, Strawser argues for a moral duty 
to employ UAV’s as opposed to exposing soldiers to unnecessary risk, contending 
“that in certain contexts UAV employment is not only ethically permissible, but 
is, in fact, ethically obligatory” (Strawser 2010: 344).22 Statman points to the mo-
tivational benefits of safe warfare in enlisting risk-averse nations to take part in 
humanitarian military interventions (Statman 2015: 3; 2014: 42–43). 
In “Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare”, however, Walzer worries that this 
capacity for riskless warfare makes drones dangerously tempting. The ability to 
17 Walzer 2016: 16, note 10, with reference to Gusterson 2016.
18 Waldron 2015: 14 citing first hand report by David Rohde, “Reuters Magazine: The 
Drone Wars,” Reuters, January 26, 2012.
19 For discussion of this argument, see: McMahan 2013: xi-xii, and in Statman 2015: 4; 
2014: 44.
20 Cf. Waldron 2015: 4–5, Statman 2015: 5; 2014: 43–44.
21 See Statman 2015: 8; 2014: 44.
22 See also Strawser 2013: 3–24, 17–20.
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kill the enemy without risking our soldiers makes killing too easy, leading to a re-
laxation of the targeting rules and actually increasing general unfocused warfare 
(Walzer 2013). Moreover, unlike soldiers in conventional wars, drones and their 
remote operators cannot demonstrate “due care” for civilians by assuming risks 
on their behalf.23 Walzer invites “us to imagine a war in which there won’t be any 
casualties (on our side), no veterans who spend years in VA hospitals, no funerals. 
The easiness of fighting with drones should make us uneasy. This is a dangerously 
tempting technology” (Walzer 2016: 15). This diagnosis appears painfully plausi-
ble – zero risk warfare encourages trigger happiness. 
The appropriate remedy is less clear, bearing in mind the images of war para-
plegics and body bags invoked by Walzer’s comment. It seems entirely preposter-
ous, even slightly grotesque and obscene, to place our young soldiers, and probably 
also enemy civilians, in greater physical danger by reverting to lower tech weap-
ons. Walzer does not suggest this. In fact, the only appropriate response in keeping 
with jus in bello is actually more targeted warfare: using drone capacity to focus 
the aim as narrowly as humanly and technologically possible, attempting to hit the 
enemy-target and preferably no one else. Any other use of drones is clearly unac-
ceptable, as is any other use of a sling shot, or a bow and arrow. Complaints about 
the misuse and over-use of drones (Walzer 2016: 12, 15–18; 2013), intentionally or 
negligently terrorizing populations (Waldron 2015: 14), ought rightly to be aimed 
at particular policies and policy makers, rather than at the technology. 
Targeting Terror with UAV’s
Assassinating avowed terrorists in the course of an armed conflict as a preventive, 
rather than punitive, measure is a legitimate act of self-defense, no less, and per-
haps more so, than killing soldiers in combat. Certainly, it is more defensible than 
related acts of political assassination, which we tend to condone when we share the 
assassin’s judgment of his victim. In the case of terrorists, there is little possibility 
of disagreement among liberals concerning the moral evaluation of the targets in 
light of the horrific nature of their deeds. While the debate over the expediency of 
targeted killing remains inconclusive and contested, there are at least good reasons 
to believe that targeting terrorists is conducive to defense, which is all that can be 
reasonably required of any military strike. Moreover, since military operations – 
specifically those aimed at terrorists – are often something of a gamble, targeted 
killing (with drones or otherwise) bears the distinct moral advantage of aiming nar-
rowly at combatants and minimizing civilian casualties. 
The legal and moral status of irregular combatants is neither on a par with the 
status of soldiers nor comparable to that of civilian criminals. While it is difficult 
to specify precise limits for distinguishing irregular combat from some forms of 
organized crime, it seems clear that organizations dedicated to an ongoing violent 
struggle against Israel or the U.S., and now also Europe, are not civilian criminal 
organizations. Whether we call them “irregulars” or “unlawful combatants”, or 
23 On “due care” for civilians and Walzer’s requirement that soldiers take demonstrative 
risks in order to prevent excessive harm to civilians, see Walzer 1977: 155–156, and Walzer, 
Margalit 2009: 6. 
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simply describe them as “civilians performing the function of a combatant”, ter-
rorists are active agents of an armed struggle.24
As direct participants in hostilities, terrorists are not entitled to the due process 
protections of the criminal justice system and are subject instead to the liabilities 
and vagaries of the wars in which they willingly partake. Trying and sentencing 
offenders is a job for the law courts rather than the army. Targeted killing in the 
course of an ongoing low-intensity conflict is, by contrast, a form of combat rath-
er than punishment or revenge; as such, it need not comply with any procedural 
requirements for trying those accused of crimes committed in the past. 
At the same time, irregulars who do not abide by the laws of war are not enti-
tled to the specifically conventional protections accorded to lawful combatants, 
such as the right not to be targeted in civilian locations or to the status of prisoner 
of war when captured (all are naturally entitled to human rights). Terrorists are le-
gitimate targets for military attack whether they are targeted by name or by deed, 
at all times and places, subject only to necessity and proportionality. 
The legal standard of proportionality in war requires that the military objective 
be attained at the lowest possible cost to genuine civilians. Due care for civilians 
during targeting missions involves weighing the value of each target as against the 
harm to their surroundings and taking relevant precautions concerning the loca-
tion and precise timing of attack, selecting appropriate methods and weapons, 
and possibly introducing a degree of oversight consistent with the supervision of 
other wartime measures. Beyond conventional tactics, named killing may warrant 
some institutional guarantees against abuse and ulterior motives because of the 
individualized nature of the killing and its affinity with assassination. Secondary 
concerns notwithstanding, named killing exhibits the greatest conformity with the 
jus in bello requirement of distinction. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles have the capacity to perform this task at a distance, 
focusing lethal harm at a liable target while minimizing collateral deaths, provided 
of course that we program them to do just this. If we do not, the fault is not in our 
drones, but in ourselves. Unlike many conventional weapons (though not unlike 
long range missiles and aerial bombing), drones pose no danger to their operators. 
Some count this as a point in their favor, while others worry about the dangers of 
riskless warfare. This dispute is largely academic. Either way, no state in its right 
mind would give up the strategic superiority offered by drones. Not only are drones 
safe to use, but we also need not worry too much about their proliferation. Drones 
are essentially weapons of powerful states. 
While it is true that a single predator may not be all that expensive, running a 
drone program requires a huge complicated, massive infrastructure around it. Addi-
tionally, drones are only effective where complete air superiority is established, as 
is the case with the US drone program in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Non-
State actors don’t have this. Without state-level air superiority, slow flying drones 
are easily (pathetically and almost instantly) shot down.25 
24 HCJ 769/02 [Dec. 11 2005], esp. paragraph 31. 
25 I am very grateful to B. J. Strawser for discussion, and esp. for his detailed explana-
tions of the technical complexity of running an effective drone system. 
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Moreover, drones are not only weapons of states, but particularly effective for 
those states that care about complying with discrimination and proportionality, 
since drones are very good at that. This type of asymmetry or double standard – 
enabling law abiding states to fight safely against terrorists who cannot respond 
in kind – is a good thing. The surgical killing of identified enemy combatants is 
as good as war gets, certainly compared to the common practice of killing young 
conscripts in battle and incurring large scale collateral damage. 
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Ciljano ubijanje dronovima?  
Stari argumenti, nove tehnologije
Apstrakt
Pitanje kako se boriti s terorizmom u skladu s našim postojećim moralnim i zakonskim ob-
vezama sada izaziva Europu, kao i Izrael i Sjedinjene Američke Države: kako primeniti teoriju 
pravednog rata i međunarodno pravo na asimetrični rat, posebno na naše protivterorističke 
mere? Šta nas može klasični moralni argument u pravednim i nepravednim ratovima naučiti 
o savremenim ciljanim ubistvima dronovima? Počinjem odbranom ciljanog ubijanja, raspra­
vljajući o prednostima napada sa tačno određenim ciljem nad bilo kojom alternativnom me-
rom koja je na raspolaganju za borbu protiv terorizma. Pretpostavljajući legitimnost ubijanja 
boraca u periodima rata, tvrdim da nema ničega lošeg, i zapravo da ima mnogo toga što je 
dobro, s ciljanjem određenih terorista odabranih po imenu, sve dok se može razumno oče-
kivati  da će se njihovim ubistvom smanjiti teroristička neprijateljstva, a ne povećati. Nakon 
toga, nudim neka dalja razmišljanja i komentare o korišćenju daljinski upravljanih letelica za 
izvršavanje ciljanih ubistava i bavim se različitim izvorima nelagode s tom praksom koje su 
identifikovali Majkl Volzer i drugi.
Ključne reči: dronovi, ciljano ubijanje, opravdanje, asimetrični rat, terorizam
